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Aging As Symbolic Interaction1
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University
Introduction
Social gerontology, which is the study of social aging, has moved into an
increasingly ironic position in recent years. While the growth of empirical studies
seeking to add to new knowledge to the field has grown precipitously, the
conceptual and theoretical understandings necessary to interpret those findings ,
place them within broader contexts and meanings and provide the basis for
informed, knowledgeable interventions by practitioners have not kept pace with the
outpouring of data.

There is, as a result, a growing theoretical and conceptual lag in social
gerontology that threatens to seriously undermine the prodigious outpouring of
scholarship and science. Unless the wealth of data and findings produced by recent
researchers can be anchored in more general theoretical and conceptual frameworks
there is a great danger that much of the current effort in social gerontological
research will simply be for naught, and that the progressive, cumulative building of
knowledge will be seriously impeded by the failure of general social aging theory to
keep pace with the research outpouring.
Review of recent work on social aging theory suggests the following general
conclusions: 1) There have been only a very few published efforts to deal with aging
theory at all during the past five years; 2) There have been only a handful of serious
efforts to deal with social aging theory throughout the entire history of social
gerontology; 3) Only one major, book length attempt to critique analyze and extend
the predominant activity and disengagement theory approaches has been published
in recent years; and 4) Several sources suggest or state directly that social
gerontology is largely without unifying theory or a theoretical paradigm in any
meaningful sense.
One can conclude from this that social gerontology continues to be theoretically
moribund. It is the principal contention of this paper that such a state of affairs
seriously limits the efforts of social practitioners seeking to ameliorate the practical
problems of aging persons and populations.
This paper consists of four parts. Part I is a review of the relationship of
research and theory in social gerontology. Part II outlines the case for a symbolic
interactionist theory of aging. Symbolic interaction is identified and discussed as a
theoretical orientation compatible with a significant portion of the research in aging
done within the “activity theory” tradition, and also capable of contributing to and
informing intervention. Part III explores a number of recent efforts toward
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synthesis in social gerontology and Part IV explores contributions of those efforts to
a symbolic interactionist theory of aging.

Why Theory?
Clearly, social gerontology has been a largely empirical, atheoretical science for
most of its history. Consequently it is to be expected that a common reaction among
gerontologists to the current state of affairs is simply, who cares? There always
seems to be an abundance of current research findings worthy of consideration and
in recent years there have been annotated bibliographies, textbooks and literature
reviews that distill those findings for various purposes. Why then, should we need
theory in social gerontology?
The general answer to this question of course is that in the sciences theory
facilitates the general tasks of describing, explaining and predicting, as well as the
scientific objectives of reliable and valid findings. It does so primarily through a
focus on consistency and parsimony. That is, any satisfactory social theory is likely
to involve a consistent set of assumptions on which it is based, a consistent
vocabulary of concepts that serve as key terms in a parsimonious set of consistent
propositions. In a field as broad and encompassing as social aging, such theory
might be general, seeking to encompass all aspects of the topic, or substantive,
seeking to describe and explain only specific issues or topics (Glaser & Strauss, ). As
Richard Bernstein has recently argued, adequate social theory should be
simultaneously empirical, logical and critical (Bernstein, 1976). That is, hypotheses
derived from social theory should be consistent with real world data; assumptions,
terms and propositions should be logically consistent and precise; and propositions
should allow for evaluation of current practices and institutions.
The growth of research in social gerontology in the United has shown continuing
concern for empirical evidence. Indeed, hundreds, and possible thousands of
empirical studies have been published in journals, or presented at conferences. And
the importance of this body of research for social problems, public policy and social
interventions is consistently maintained and robustly criticized, although one can
sometimes argue with the premises or basis of such criticisms. The principal
problem in social aging theory is with the logical basis of much of the research
enterprise, a view which potentially extends forward into criticisms of the relevance
of many of those studies and back into the reliability and validity of findings as the
basis for interventions with older people.
Social gerontologists, like researchers in many other fields, have generally found
workable alternatives to attending to social theory in what C. Wright Mills labeled
abstracted empiricism (Mills, 1959). By this term, Mills called attention to research
that relies on increasingly sophisticated research methods and techniques but failed
to call upon or utilize the rich theoretical traditions of sociology (or, one might add,
the other social sciences). In the same vein, Mills also criticized another approach
he called “grand theory”. A decade earlier, Robert K. Merton called for the
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integration of theory and empirical data in “theories of the middle range” (Merton,
1949, 39-53).

I.

Research and Theory in Social Gerontology

The main points to be made in this part of the paper are that: 1) Theory in social
gerontology has been exclusively a byproduct of research, one part abstracted
empiricism and another part theory of the middle range. Activities done in the
name of theory have been primarily concerned with identification of testable
hypotheses incorporating metaphors of the social aging process. 3) The main
candidates for prominence among these metaphor-hypotheses have been activity,
disengagement, age integration and continuity theories. 4) Each of these has
important implications for policy and practice; 5) The objective should be to
incorporate the best empirical and critical features of each within a single
theoretical synthesis.

Theory As A Biproduct of Research
All of what are usually identified as the major theoretical perspectives in social
aging are closely identified with specific, major research ventures. There have been
only one or two efforts to generate social theory of aging independent of research
investigations. Such a circumstance is, of course, not at all unusual in social science.
In general, however, the character of social research interests have tended to cut off
aging theory as a matter of concern from both traditional social theories in sociology
or the other social sciences and from social practitioners. Among those social
theorists whose principal interest are in creating a unified body of social thought
one can find scant evidence of any awareness of or response to the age revolution of
the 20th century or the social circumstances of old people or the aging process.
Human aging plays no role, for example, in the work of such social theorists as Max
Weber, Talcott Parsons, Jürgen Habermas, Hans Joas or Niklas Luhmann.
Among legislators, social workers and other social practitioners whose primary
concerns are with using theory to guide and inform problem solving, the impact of
aging theory has been pronounced, but restricted almost exclusively to the
superficial aspects of the activity theory. The likely reasons for this are simple: The
relationships between theory and action are quite different for researchers than
they are for either theorists or practitioners and the researchers have largely
determined theories of aging. Theory in social research has addressed two principal
thrusts. On the one hand, theory provides the model for specific inquiries guiding
the overview of a particular investigation, focusing and directing investigators’
attention, setting assumptions and generally enveloping the practical tasks of
conducting research. On the other hand, specific theories (usually substantive
theories or theories of the middle ground) provide specific hypotheses – a logical
context from which one “derives or deduces research questions, finds the language
to state hypotheses specifically and the language by which to interpret findings and
draw conclusions. By contrast the social theorist is likely to interpret the
researcher’s model or research design as one fragment of a much larger mosaic that
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must be carefully and tightly woven together and specific hypotheses as derivative
products of the theoretical enterprise.
At the same time, the social practitioner is concerned with developing or
utilizing theory in two ways: 1) to define problems by analogy, that is to focus on the
isomorphism of theory and common sense observations in real situations in order to
minimize the problematic aspects of the latter and to lower the costs of trial and
error problem-solving by deriving plausible explanations and possible solutions
from the theory.
Thus, acting on theory means three quite different things to these groups: for the
researcher, it means hypothesis generation or construction. For the theorist, it
means incremental additions to existing logical constructions. And for the
practitioners it means detailing rules and protocols for action. Only the researchers
interests are well-served by current theory in social gerontology.

Textbooks and Research Inventories
One interesting approach to the absence of adequate theory in social aging is
what might be termed a taxonomic approach in which diverse research findings are
grouped together under various ad hoc topic headings and offered up as “social
facts” without further theoretical integration or conceptual elaboration. One can
raise serious questions about the epistemological basis for such an approach. How,
for example, without close attention to theory can we be assured that particular
words – aging, development, old age, for example – mean the same things in
different research studies? Even so, it is hard to deny that the greatest bulk of
current knowledge of the social aspects of human aging rests upon recisely this
taxonomic basis. In noting this, we create yet another argument for the need for
theory in social aging.
Several such collections bear mentioning in this regard. The classic Handbook of
Social Gerontology (Tibbitts, 1960) and Handbook of Aging in Western Societies
(1959) were the first such collections in the then-fledgling field of social aging. Both
volumes represent their editors’ amalgams of topics such as health and employment
and retirement, and basic topics such as demography, families, voluntary
associations and government programs. Such an approach can be seen as some sort
of proxy for theoretical synthesis and has continued virtually unchanged in second,
third, and later generations of such handbooks.
Riley, et. al, employed a slightly more grounded, taxonomic approach in their
development of Volume 1 of the three-volume Aging and Society series: An
Inventory of Research Findings but the result is still best described as pretheoretical, or perhaps proto-theoretical.
In general, this alternative approach to genuine theory building, such as it is,
and the underlying approach to research has cut social aging theory off from two
important groups. First, social theory specialists in the social sciences, from Talcott
Parsons, who is theoretically, the antithesis of Mead and Blumer to classic works
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from Hobbes to Tocqueville and beyond have one thing in common: there is no
mention of older people as a serious or important feature of society. Secondly, social
practitioners in social work, public health, housing, education and numerous other
practice fields interested in knowledge-based interventions are similarly cut off
from the continuing output of research findings by the difficulties of summarizing
and synthesizing these results. What this suggests, then, is the need for some
greater or more sustained attention to building social theory of aging. Many
practitioners have already done this for themselves, although this does not ease the
task of incorporating new findings. Others merely assume that such syntheses must
exist somewhere; they just haven’t found them yet.

Looking Closer at Theory
Closer examination of the major theoretical perspectives in aging theory makes
clear the extent to which this is the case. One can identify four primary theoretical
perspectives in the social gerontology literature. These are generally labeled as the
activity, disengagement, age integration and continuity theories. Each is not really
a theory at all; rather, each is a testable hypothesis incorporating within it a key
metaphor of the aging process. The oldest of these perspectives is activity theory
which was first laid out by Ruth Cavan, E.W. Burgess, Robert Havighurst and
Herbert Goldhammer in 1949 (Cavan, 1949). In their view, remaining active is the
key to “successful aging” which is interpreted as meaning remaining socially
engaged and happy.
Although many sources have noted that this “theory” has never been formalized,
it would appear that there isn’t actually anything there to formalize other than the
single activity hypothesis noted just above and the implicit research model used by
Cavan, et. al. to ground their inquiry. This activity hypothesis , however, has had
enormous practical implications. Much of the policy thrust of federal and state
governmental actions for the aged have been based on the notion that “an active old
person is a happy old person (and that is good). Activity programs as cures for
depression and despondency among older people have been common prescriptions as
well.
The second aging theory is the disengagement theory that was first formulated
in a book written by Elaine Cumming and William Henry (Cumming and Henry,
1959). It too is not a theory of aging, but a compound statement hypothesis that
suggests that as people age they “naturally” withdraw from “society” which
similarly and reciprocally withdraws (or disengages) from them and that the
process is mutually satisfactory to the older person and the society. As a metaphor
disengagement brings into play both interpersonal concerns for loneliness,
withdrawal, and moral with social structural anomie-like concerns. The process of
disengagement was said by its discoverers to be both universal and functional for
the person and for the society. Presumably, its implications for social intervention
are similar to those of other functionalist theories: action should be taken to
facilitate disengagement and minimize the dysfunctional consequences of
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prevented or prolonged disengagement. That message seems clear: Leave the
disengaged alone. Theoretically, disengagement is part of the larger mosaic of
sociological functionalism and purports to show that the interest of society and of
the person are one.
The third theoretical approach to aging revolves around an effort to capitalize on
the metaphor of the black experience and racial integration in the United States in
order to understand the plight of older people. First formulated as “the minority
group theory of aging” in a textbook by Milton Barrow, the central question of this
theoretical approach is whether the aged should live in “age segregated” or “ageintegrated” settings. One can find various hypotheses defending one or another of
these points of view with empirical evidence.
The most sophisticated statement of this view has come from Irving Rosow, who
uses role theory to make the case for settings in which old people are “insulated but
not isolated” from larger social worlds. This interesting phrase offers the central
imagery of the integration perspective and slightly restated in formal language
provides its key hypotheses as well. Tied as the two other perspectives are to a
criterion of life satisfaction as the preferred outcome of the aging process, the
minority group theory of aging has also been the considerable intervention
especially in the area of housing for the elderly and retirement communities. More
recently there is evidence of renewed interest in comparing the old and other
minority groups as deprived populations. However, it cannot really be suggested
that aging studies have made any general contributions to minority group
understandings in general.
Finally, the latest entrant into the aging theory sweepstakes has been the
continuity theory in psychology. In this view the predominant metaphor for social
aging is consistency and the notable absence of change over the life cycle is
personality makeup – a finding that would seem to have obvious linkages to activity
levels, role performance and the levels of social engagement. In contrast to some of
the models of aging by Erik Erikson and others focused on age-related changes in
personality and behavior, the continuity theory approach focuses on underlying
stability. Its theoretical implications are genuinely unclear while its practical
implications appear to be virtually identical with those of the activity approach – at
least for those who have been active in their younger years. In contrast, the
continuity approach would suggest also that those who are disengaged in old age
probably were also withdrawn and uninvolved in their larger social lives at younger
ages as well. Similarly, those aged persons living in age-segregated circumstances
probably also preferred age-segregated circumstances earlier in their lives (e.g.,
adults-only communities or new suburbs with only young families).
It should be obvious from this review that there are enormous areas of overlap
and commonality among these four ostensibly independent theoretical traditions.
While activity and disengagement are often presented as rival theoretical
traditions, it seems more appropriate to view them as rival hypothesis within the
same, broad theoretical tradition. This may, in a very real sense, be yet another
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skirmish between the interactional and the functionalist ways of doing social
science and talking about the results. Further, all four hypotheses/theories involve
at least an implicit linkage to dimensions of personal well-being. Since my colleague
(and wife) Nancy Lohmann has shown life satisfaction, morale and adjustment as
used in researchers in these diverse orientations are both conceptually and
operationally synonymous, it seems likely that we are dealing here not with four
theories at all but rather with four loosely related formulations in the direction of a
single theoretical field that has yet to be fully articulated.
And what would be the implications of such an articulation? Most importantly,
we must admit that we are dealing with something here that has shown itself to be
much more powerful than either evidence or argument: We are dealing with
independent, autonomous research traditions that have grown up around each of
these different approaches and all of those involved have much (perhaps too much)
invested in seeing only differences and ignoring similarities, identities and overlaps.
We began the decade of the 1970s with the impasse in social aging theory
already stabilized: the disengagement, activity and integration hypotheses had
already been stated and communities of true believers were already in place, and
continuity entered the picture fairly early in the decade (Atchley, 1971). Further, no
new theoretical critiques have surfaced in the past decade, although the issues
involved have been refined and stated with increasing elegance. The only real
change has been the addition of the continuity metaphor to the list, and as we shall
see below, there is reason to assume that continuity is, in most cases, just another
word for activity.
Furthermore, there is good reason to suspect that the theoretical impasse in
social aging will continue as long as researchers continue to be the sole arbiters of
theory in social aging, because continuation of the current state of affairs is clearly
compatible with the best interests of researchers everywhere. It is my contention
that, in what may appear to be an ironic twist, if theory is to develop it should be
expected to arise from among age-related practitioners rather than researchers
because the latter have a strong vested interest in existing paradigms and the
former have a greater interest in seeing things whole. Further since such theory
will inevitably have a practical bent the underlying pragmatics of symbolic
interaction makes it a particularly attractive set of possibilities.

II.

Symbolic Interaction and Social Aging Theory

Symbolic interactionism has been one of the longest standing, but also one of the
more controversial of American social scientific theoretical perspectives. The
underlying philosophy of pragmatism was shaped originally by three philosophers:
Charles Sanders Pierce, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and the philosopherpsychologist, William James. One of the most interesting and novel contemporary
interpreters of pragmatism is Richard Bernstein (Bernstein , 1971; Bernstein, 1976;
Bernstein, 1981). As Bernstein shows, Jurgen Habermas, Hans Joas and other
European philosophers are currently exploring this most American of philosophies.
7

Interactionism per se is largely credited to Mead, with the assistance of Charles
Horton Cooley, and a variety of “Chicago School” sociologists. After decades of being
in important degrees an oral tradition, in the past decade, numerous introductions
to symbolic interactionism have become available (Maines, 1977; Manis, 1967;
Meltzer, Petras & Reynolds, 1975; Stone & Faberman, 1981).
Herbert Blumer, a principal expositor of the social psychological work of Mead
and leader of one of the major interactionist perspectives suggests that there are
three distinct premises of symbolic interactionism: 1) Human beings act toward
things on the basis of the meanings those things have for them; 2) Meaning arises
as a product of social interaction; and 3) Meanings are modified and handled
through interpretive processes for dealing with the signs involved (Blumer, 1969;
Blumer, 1971).
The subjective emphasis on meaning, for example, has been interpreted as
setting interactionism in marked contrast to Skinnerian behaviorism, Freudianism
and structural-functional sociology because of the deterministic and objectivist
stances of each. It is also the basis for the interactionist proclivity for field and case
study methods and participant observation techniques and the on-going critique of
Blumer and others of the sloppy, casual inferential processes associated with
defining and “variables”. Interpreted at its weakest, the meaning premise of
interactionism can be seen as a caveat to social science theory to explain findings
from the standpoint of the actors involved, rather than from the specious “objective”
(or grandstand) position of allegedly neutral researchers. At its strongest, the
meaning premise can be a rigid criterion ruling out of the realm of science most of
20th century social science. As it may contribute to social aging theory, the meaning
premise suggests that much of the significance of social aging is a matter of the
ways in which persons interpret the changes in themselves and their lives as they
grow older.
The second of Blumer’s premises is typically interpreted by interactionists as
possessing two principal thrusts: First, that none of us is born as a social being; that
we become social beings beginning in infancy and early childhood through processes
involving interpreting gestures, acquiring language and the emergence of a self that
is capable of acting toward itself and others. An important part of this process is a
form of learning labeled role-taking through which we learn to construct our
behavior in situations on the basis of what we expect and then interpret the
expectations of others on us. In more contemporary language, this learning process
is closely related to the “social construction of reality” (Berger & Luckman, 1967).
Secondly, Blumer’s second premise is typically interpreted to mean that all social
behavior is “situated” and fully understandable only by reference to the context or
situation in which it occurs.
Finally, the third of Blumer’s premises is generally interpreted as referring to
the critical role of symbols, of which language is the foremost instance, in human
interaction. Following Cooley, communication is usually interpreted by
interactionists as the basis of establishing and maintaining social order and
8

language analysis has been a key interactionist focus of concern (Cooley, 1983;
Lindesmith, Strauss & Denzen, 1975; Strauss, 1959).
Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds in their review of the current state of symbolic
interactionism have suggested that there is a continuing need for the orientation to
become more involved with major economic political and social issues, including
human aging (Meltzer, Petra and Reynolds, 1975). With very few exceptions, those
who identify as symbolic interactionists have generally failed to incorporate a
concern with human aging into any of the central concerns of the interactionist
paradigm.
One important exception to this is the continuing work of Helena Lopata, who
has placed her work on widowhood squarely with the interactionist tradition of role
studies (Lopata, 1973; Lopata, 1979). In an important age-related example, Lopata’s
concept of “husband sanctification” shows clearly how the meaning of a particular
social role can evolve even after the death of one of the parties to an interaction. In
another important participant-observer study, Barney Glazer and Anselm Strauss
tracked the different consequences for cancer patients dying in what they term
“open” and “closed awareness contexts” (Glaser & Strauss, 1965). They also evolved
the qualitative method of grounded theory, and developed in another participantobservation study the micro-theory of social change associated with “status
passages” (Glaser & Strauss, 1971). Strauss and others are also responsible for the
“negotiated order” theory of hospitals, schools, and other organizations (Day, 1977;
Maines, 1978; Martin, 1975; O’Toole, 1981; Strauss, et. al., 1963).
There are signs of growing interest among others on the convergence of
interactionism and social aging. A session at the 1979 meeting of the Gerontological
Society, for example, featured a round-table of papers dealing with exchange theory
and symbolic interactionism. In general, however, these have been exceptions
rather than the rule as the study of aging has never been a highly visible topic in
interactionist research circles and interactionists have never been particularly
active in aging studies, except as noted above.
It is genuinely ironic that symbolic interactionism and social gerontology have
grown up and apart as separate, autonomous subfields in the social sciences. One
reason for this is historical. The study of social aging grew from the same fertile soil
of Chicago pragmatism and sociology that produced symbolic interaction, and
during roughly the same post-WWII period. The list of Chicago sociologists
prominent in social gerontology is long and illustrious, including such well-known
names as E.W. Burgess, Arnold Rose, and the “father” of gerontology in Tennessee,
my friend the late William (Bill) Cole. One would think that given the intellectual
and physical proximity of gerontology and symbolic interactionism, the isolation of
the two areas would be less complete than it has, in fact, been.
One reason for such separation might be the applied, meliorist character of much
work in gerontology, and the more scholarly, pure science stance of much symbolic
interactionism. Although many interactionist participant-observation studies have

9

attracted large audiences among social practitioners, it seems to be much harder to
extract practice principles from them. It seems to be much easier to do so from work
in the structural-functional perspective. This alone does not explain the matter,
however. One example of this is the applied work of interactionists interested in
deviance to the field of juvenile corrections.
Over and beyond mere historical lineages, there are also important theoretical
and conceptual parallels between symbolic interactionism and major perspectives in
social gerontology. As Jaber Gubrium has noted, the “activity theory” of aging is
deeply grounded in the work of George Herbert Mead and the interactionist
tradition (Gubrium, 1975). While Gubrium addressed the similarities between
activity theory and interactionist approaches to the concepts of social roles and the
person, he might also have noted other possible connections. The heavy emphasis in
each on situational analysis, for example. There is also an extensive oral component
in which theory is massed more by word of mouth than written documents. Both
have also generally avoided Personality-state and other stage explanations of
change, and both share a common view of social institutions and behavior. Indeed,
close scrutiny suggests that the terms activity and interaction are virtually
interchangeable in the aging literature.
At its core, however, activity theory as it has evolved during the past three
decades is only a quasi-interactional approach. In the original work by Cavan,
Burgess, Havighurst and Goldhammer, the critical interactionist issue of the
meaning that might be assigned to any given set of activities or might have for the
older person were never taken fully into account. Further, in all the voluminous
literature reporting research findings from the activity theory perspective, one is
hard pressed to find much systematic effort to redress this oversight. As a result,
activity theory in aging has grown up on the curious assumption that it is the mere
experience of action – any action- and not how acts are interpreted by older people
and their significant others which is the most fundamental concern It is possible to
suggest that while activity theory is an interaction theory, it is not symbolic
interactionism.
While it might be suggested that this is just the kind of knot-picking criticism
one might expect from an interactionist gerontologist, it should be noted also that
overlooking the dimensions of meaning in activity has had the most serious
consequences for social gerontology Most importantly, it has tended to trivialize
both social research and resulting social policy based on activity. In the area of
social research, for example, there is an extensive tradition of role enumeration that
involves literally counting social roles and drawing conclusions from the numerical
results. It is as though researchers working in this mode were genuinely convinced
that the quantity of roles assumed by a person was the critical dimension in social
relationships; that more is better. An older person who was forced to retire from
work, lost their spouse, but joined a social club, volunteer as a school crossing guard
and took up a hobby would show a net gain of one role, and thus represent a case of
successful aging!
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What such an approach does, of course, is replace anything resembling
meaningful activity with a notion of activity as diversity or quantity. The number of
misinterpretations that might result from such over-simplifications are simply too
numerous to deal with in a short paper. The notion that a surgeon or police officer
accustomed to dealing with issues of life and death, for example, would represent a
case of successful aging merely by taking up participation in a senior center, playing
pool or making potholders boggles the mind. While it seems very likely that in
counting roles Cavan, et. al. were merely looking for a quantitative index of activity
as a measurable variable the ensuing 30-year tradition of role-counting has become
an increasingly threadbare example of legitimized nonsense that well deserves the
designation of the “me and my potholder” theory of aging.
It is not just researchers who have failed to take into account the meanings of
activities for older people. In a very real sense the Older Americans Act and the
entire resulting Administration on Aging as well as national interest groups like the
National Council on Aging carry a heavy intellectual burden due to activity theory:
Activity centers and recreation programs, senior centers and a welter of social
programs for older people are premised on the idea that people dealing with the
losses of old age require substitute activities (any activities!) and replacement roles
(any roles!) in order to successfully age. From its earliest elaborations, failures to
take into account the meanings of activity for the older person has tended to
trivialize rather than describe and explain the social processes of getting old.
Reorientation of activity theory to take account of the meanings those activities
have for the person would not only tend to make apparent the underlying
relationships to symbolic interactions. It would also resolve the most serious
theoretical deficiencies of this approach. With adequate attention to the issues of
meaning, activity theory is a symbolic interactionist theory. Still, I do not want to
leave the reader with the understanding that my principal interest is in
reformulation of activity theory. This is not a proposal that the poor, unfortunate
activity theorists be helped to escape the consequences of an inadequate theoretical
paradigm formulated 30 years ago. If activity theory in aging could be revitalized by
discovering the long-lost meaning premise that would be fine, but my primary
interest in this example lies in other directions. I am primarily interested in the
implications of social aging for symbolic interaction.
Not only is it the case that interactionism has something to offer social
gerontology, it is equally clear that symbolic interactionism cannot ever be
considered theoretically complete until the general theory of social aging already
implicit in the interactionist view is made explicit. Let us examine this point in
greater detail. There are, in general, two approaches that one might take to the
study of the social aspects of human aging. The first of these is what might be
termed a special topics approach. This is most common in contemporary sociology,
and indeed several other social sciences, today. In this approach researchers in
various disciplines use a core repertory of concepts grounded in the theoretical
traditions of their disciplines to describe and explain age-relevant phenomena. This
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is the case, for example, in the tradition of social role studies in both activity and
disengagement theories. In this sense aging studies by interactionists might be
concerned with such topics as language usage among senile old people, nursing
homes as total institutions, retirements as status passages and changes in the older
self and reference others (c.f., Edelman, 1974; Glaser & Strauss, 1971; Goffman,
1962; Mead, 1936).
There is also a second, more fundamental sense in which theories of aging as
personal change and social process could be approached as basic, constituent topics
of interactionist social theory. Human aging is one of the truly universal facts of
social and personal existence. In a simple biological sense we are all born, grow (to
some extent developing and declining simultaneously) and eventually die.
Critically, there is no real sense of these larger realities in activity, disengagement,
age integration or continuity perspectives, or in notions of “successful aging”.
Throughout our lives, also our social lives occur across time. Thus, to act is to age,
and to age is to accumulate memories of past actions and anticipate future acts, to
gain experience and to build repertories of tested responses, workable strategies
and more. Yet basic questions of how this affects our activities, whether it is
connected to dynamics of disengagement, or precisely how aging selves maintain
continuity in the face of such dynamics are not currently part of theoretical
understandings of social aging.
There is already the beginning of a theory of human social aging (or if you
prefer, lifespan development) in the general understandings implicit in symbolic
interactionist approaches, although it is heavily skewed toward the young end of
the age spectrum. G.H. Mead outlined a process in which social relations, minds,
selves and language use develop simultaneously and spontaneously and accumulate
in the movement from gestures to increasing verbal acuity and a sense of self
gradually develops out of the pre-existing social nexus. Further, interactionist
studies of identity track these dynamics up through adolescence and young
adulthood. But both aging and interactionist theory are unclear on how these
dynamics play out in middle and old age. Despite a plethora of what we might find
“pre-theoretical” research findings on these questions
As with nearly all topics in interactionism, this line of argument can be traced
quickly back to George Herbert Mead. In this case, it is suggested that Mead’s focus
on the processes that culminate in persons becoming fully human through the
acquisition of role Dash taking abilities represents an incomplete model of human
aging. Unfortunately, interactionists have generally held back from the project of
extending Mead’s work beyond these initial stages into adulthood, the metal years,
and old age. As a consequence, they have ignored the prospects of a genuine
interactionist theory of aging.
While interactionists have been quick to point out the deficiencies and
inadequacies of simplistic stage theories of human development, such as those of
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Erikson or Kubler Ross, positive statements which would offer interactionist
alternatives to their approaches have not been forthcoming. Instead, interactionist
have generally been content to leave things where Howard S Becker found them in
1964, when in discussing Personal Change in Old Age, he concluded:
The processes we have considered indicate that social structure
creates the conditions for both change and stability in adult life.
The structural characteristics of institutions and organizations
provide the framework of the situations in which experience
dictates the expediency of change. Similarly, they provide the
counters with which side-bets can be made and the links
between lines of activity out of which commitment grows.
Together, they enable us to arrive at general explanations of
personal development in adult life without requiring us to posit
unvarying characteristics of the person, either elements of
personality or of ‘value structure’ (Becker, 1964).
The processes Becker refers to are: 1) situational adjustment, “in which
individuals take on the characteristics required by the situations they participate in
2) commitment “in which externally unrelated interests of the person become linked
in such a way as to constrain future behavior” (Becker, 1964). In Becker’s view, all
people are first and foremost adults who had, hopefully, more opportunities than
most to make commitments and adjust to situations. While they may have gained
from the experience in a personal sense, old people are not fundamentally different
from other adults in the same sense, for example, that pre-verbal children are from
older children.
Aging in this view is primarily accumulating life experience in structured
circumstances. However, it is important to note that this approach does not rule out
the possibilities of certain universal, defining characteristics of social aging. It only
castigates such universals grounded in personality or values. However, the
interactionist aversion for stage models of development and other simplistic
progressive schemes for life span development should not be considered sufficient
grounds for abandoning any possibility of discovering universals other than those
already identified in the early life process of becoming human as discussed by Mead.
For to do so is to block from view the possibilities of the interactionist theory of
aging referred to above.
Becker’s general view is as sound today as it was when first set out in print 16
years ago. Unfortunately, the general explanations of personal development in adult
life that were said to be possible at that time have yet to emerge in the
interactionist literature. Meanwhile, what has emerged in general social
gerontology are a welter of collections of raw data, ad hoc hypotheses, and
situational explanations of every conceivable hue and stripe. Of these, such as
Lopata’s process of husband sanctification and Glaser and Strauss’ awareness
contexts among dying patients are clearly within interactionist frames of reference.
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Others appear quite compatible with interactionism. For example, Frances
Carp’s concept of retirement as a transitional life stage has much in it to attract
interactionist attention. It bears much resemblance to the more general Glaser and
Strauss’ status passage. Further, the recent findings of Maas and Kuypers (1974) of
longitudinal continuity in the personalities and attitudes of a sample of older people
studied over a 40 year period has a ready explanation in Becker: Such attitudinal
consistency, to the extent he is not simply an attribute of the measurement process
itself, is most probably a reflection of high levels of stability in situations and
commitments made earlier in life and not to inherent psychological tendencies
toward personality stability among older persons.
Some perspectives social gerontology, however, also stand clearly outside the
interactionist tradition, and indeed, counter to it. In particular, the disengagement
theory tradition has been the principal counter position to activity theory. The
functionalism of this perspective is apparent throughout its posing of a universal,
bilateral and inevitable process of withdrawal and social isolation of older persons
from society and the reciprocal with drawl of society from the older person. Hey, the
macro-sociological approach of age-grading developed by Matilda white Riley and
her colleagues stands apart from interactionism in its abstract “age status
structures” mysteriously depersonalized, and detached from the meanings of
everyday life.
Ever, what has yet to emerge from social gerontology are clear statements of the
processes of adjustment and commitment hinted at by Becker, which are the
fundamental, indeed defining, elements of social aging in the same sense that
language acquisition and role-taking define the process of childhood development.
And until such universal, defining processes of social aging are identified both social
gerontology and symbolic interaction theory must remain necessarily incomplete.
Several plausible candidates for such general processes can be discounted
immediately. Since Becker’s comment and even before, it should have been clear
that personality stage such as Erikson’s are not adequate at a time of increasing
longevity, if they ever were (Erikson, 1959). The prospect that 30 or 40 years of a
person’s life can be reduced to a life stage defined primarily by preparation for
death is simply too simplistic.
Further, it should be clear that most of the various situational changes and
institutional responses to aging individuals or not, by themselves, the sought-after
defining processes of age related change: retirement, for example, is not a signature
of old age but rather a change in situations that appears to bring approximately
similar adjustive responses from persons of any age. It is also a unique phenomenon
of modern industrial and post-industrial societies. One possibility, of course, is that
there simply are no such universal social processes which define human aging.
Mead may have been correct and complete in stopping his discussion of the process
of becoming human after the acquisition in childhood of role-taking skills; after
that, all may, indeed be individual variations of situation adjustment and changes
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in commitment. If this is so, then the challenges of articulating an interactionist
theory of aging have already been fully stated by Becker.
The likelihood that there are at least some minimal defining processes that
characterize social aging continues to grow, however, with the accumulating
biological and anthropomorphic data on aging: We know, for example, that although
age grading systems appear to be universal we still have no clear account of the
processes by which they occur. Similarly, the growing list of universal biological
changes, that includes declining muscular strength, loss of skin turgor, and the
functional capacity of most organs, declining reaction times, and a host of other
changes make the possibility of concomitant social processors highly likely. The
question however is where to begin looking for such universals.
One thread of inquiry that appears worth pursuing is the recently suggested
differentiation of the young-old from the old-old. Gen, it would appear that social
aging from the vantage point of the young old (or, the light middle aged if you
prefer) involves a series of institutional and situational adjustments including the
empty nest syndrome, and removal from the labor force, while for the old-old
(particularly those over 80) the experiences of decline and preparation for dying
assume much greater significance, along with changes in communication abilities
associated with bodily changes, and changing primary group participation.
One plausible avenue for investigation would be the effects of accumulated
experience over many years on the ‘spontaneity’ of action by older persons. Does an
older person, with years of experience, habituated responses and fixed routines
construct his /her behavior in the same ways that an adolescent in a similar
situation for whom any particular situation might be a novel experience? The
question itself poses something of a dilemma for interactionism. On the one hand, to
answer yes, that all would adapt to the situation equally, appears to deny a role for
experience. Yet, to answer no appears to undercut the indeterminacy of human
behavior. This and other questions that can be generated offer a basis for future
research investigations that will bring forth and elaborate the implicit theory of
aging currently well hidden in the interactionist paradigm. While rediscovery of the
meaning premise may result in work in this direction being undertaken within
social gerontology, there is no reason why such work should also not be done within
the rubric of symbolic interaction.
While society precedes the newly forming self logically and chronologically as
Mead suggests, it may well be the case that social aging involves the elderly person
superseding their society. We are all familiar, no doubt with the elderly dowager
who lives alone with only her memories of a social world that is no more. But I am
speaking here of a far more immediate, familiar and universal instance in which
virtually everyone supersedes the family of origin and primary groups that provided
their initial socialization. Establishing autonomy from one’s family of origin, the
empty nest syndrome, surviving the deaths of one’s parents are all aspects of this
reformation of one’s social world. In the simplest case, the infant is dependent on
others for his very survival. As we mature, social contact with others becomes
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increasingly a matter of choice until finally in old age the necessity of others may be
a complete luxury.
Such changes in the nature of emergency over the lifecycle, of course, our pure
speculations. They tend to be supported, however, by changes in the basic
necessities of social existence. Degenerative changes in hearing, vision, and the
other senses for example are virtually universal and tend to impede or disrupt
normal communication of the type underlying social interaction

Criticisms of Disengagement Theory
We are hard pressed to identify criticisms of existing approaches that implicitly
or explicitly point in the direction of potential refinements. Rose summarized
existing criticisms of disengagement in 1964 noting three major lines of criticism: 1)
Questioning the process of disengagement in old age and holding it to be merely
representative of lifelong patterns of adjustment for some people (emphasis in the
original). 2) Challenges to the value judgment that disengagement is desirable for
old people. 3) Analysis of disengagement in the context of social structure and social
trends finds it a poor interpretation of the facts (Rose, 1964). More recently, this
criticism of the disengagement theory has been sharpened and focused by Arlie
Hochschild, who cites three principal problems with disengagement theory
(Hochschild, 1975). First, the usual statement of the theory make it untestable
because it literally cannot be refuted. Secondly, disengagement is said to be
universal but those who are clearly not disengaging or disengage are explained, she
says, by four “back door explanations or escape clauses” in the theory: The nondisengaged may be ‘unsuccessful disengagers’, in other words, successfully engaged
which means the process is not universal. Secondly, the non-disengaged older
person may be said to be “off in his or her timing” but still on the way to
disengaging. Thirdly, the engaged older person may be a member of a biological or
psychological elite of some sort; again, indicating that the process is not universal.
Finally, if contrary evidence cannot be accommodated with one or another of these
three escapes, she notes, the case may be a “variation of the form” (Hochschild,
1975).
Hochschild also notes what she terms the “omnibus variable problem” of
disengagement theory. The theory, she says, boils down to one dependent variable
(disengagement) and two independent variables (old age and society’s stance toward
disengagement) one of which (the latter) is actually a constant from the standpoint
of any particular individual life. One ages in a particular society and presumably
cannot elect to have one’s disengagement regulated by another. In between these
independent and dependent variables are many intervening variables representing
the standard categories of sociology such as race class, urbanity, and others that are
said by the theory only to modify the form of disengagement, which refers back to
her criticisms noted above. Recent researchers, further, have converted many of
these intervening variables into fully independent explanatory variables, thereby
presumably, weakening or even eliminating completely the explanatory power of
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the theory. Moreover, all of the resulting forms of disengagement, including these
many intervening explanations, that are said by disengagement theorists to go
together in fact do not.
Finally, Hochschild finds fault with the failure of disengagement theory to deal
consistently or explicitly with the meaning that aging has for the individual social
actor (or aged person) and the effect this has for them. This may be the most
meaningful of all her criticisms for interaction theory.
Jaber Gubrium, whose participant-observation study of a nursing home fits well
within interactionist research traditions, has also published an extensive critique
of disengagement theory (Gubrium, 1972; Gubrium, 1975). His criticisms are in
several important respects consistent with Hochschild’s view. He takes pains to
outline the functionalist origins and premises of disengagement theory, noting that
functionalism, and disengagement in this construction, is essentially a
deterministic approach to explaining behavior. Gubrium also notes problems with
locating non-disengagement as “deviance” in individual persons and not in the
surrounding society – thus, in effect, transforming it into a psychological rather
than social phenomenon. Further, he notes, disengagement theorists are never
wrong (which parallels Hochschild’s point that the theory is irrefutable); they
always verify the existence of actual or potential disengagement. This is related,
Gubrium suggests to his conclusion that the theory is tautological; the form of
disengagement as a formalism is found in the act of disengaging.
Gubrium (1975) also details somewhat similar problems with activity theory,
which assumes, he argues, that people can somehow control the types of roles
available to them and their performance of them. “They assume it is within any
normal person’s capacity to construct and develop an adjusted set of active aged
roles” (Gubrium, 1975, 10). Also, in some unaccountable manner not made clear in
the text he associates activity theory with “developmentalism” and attributes the
faults of the latter to the former. Thus, in a kind of guilt by association, he says
aactivity theory assumes a set of continuous, transitive stages of life emerging as
part of a preformed program with occasional references to a critical stage. Thirdly,
the definition of personal adjustment offered originally by Cavan and used or
assumed by nearly all later researchers creates a circularity to life satisfaction and
the factors contributing to it. Finally, a “fourth problem of the activity approach to
aging is the empirical evidence that contradicts its major proposition . .” That is,
evidence suggests that some people appear to be satisfied with their lives without
the requisite levels of activity, and some other people engage in activities without
being satisfied with their lives.

Conclusion
It is suggested above that activity, disengagement and continuity may not, in
fact, be distinguishable theories of aging, but merely rival hypotheses. Further, it is
suggested that future theoretical development of social aging theory might best be
pursued through a symbolic interactionist perspective. If one were to presumes that,
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in the language of variable analysis (which, it must be noted, Blumer, Glaser,
Strauss, Gubrium and other interactionists all reject as suitable methodology), each
“theory” offers a separate dependent variable. For some gerontologists, this means
that the question of whether they are theories or hypotheses may appear to be
pointless quibbling. There is an enduring perspective to social aging, however, from
which this distinction becomes a critically important one. That is the investigative
tradition of life satisfaction studies that has emerged from within the activitydisengagement impasse (Lohmann, 1977).
The essence of this issue was first stated by Cavan, Burgess, Havighurst and
Goldhammer in the original activity theory study. Aging, they stated “is conceived
primarily as a problem in the personal resolution of strains on self-conception
resulting from changes in later life roles” (Gubrium, 1975, 4). The older person who
successfully resolved this life challenge is, in the words of its researchers and
practitioners “successfully aged,” “happy,” or possessed of “high morale” or “life
satisfaction.” (Lohmann, 1977; Lohmann, 1979).
There are at least three reasons for taking the view of contrasting hypotheses
as opposed to social gerontologists continuing to suggest that these are separate,
contrasting theories. All three are related to avenues of possible new theoretical
development for interactionist social aging theory. First, the contrast between the
two hypotheses introduces some fairly rigorous options: Empirical data should
either support one and reflect the other, allow for the rejection of both or support
the evolution of a new theoretical synthesis of the two. Secondly, adopting the
perspective of what we will call, after Kutner “successful aging theory creates a
number of more or less clear cut pathways or linkage points between the
sociological study of aging and issues in other social science disciplines. If one
adopts the position that sociology is a self-contained theoretical universe such links
are of little interest. If, however, one adopts a unified science approach that science
at least ought to strain for some measure of unified theory such linkages should not
be scoffed at. Finally, adopting the perspective of successful aging theory recognizes
an aspect of both activity and disengagement ‘theories’ which has often been
ignored – the normative, critical dimension. In other words, if the extent of one’s
social involvement can be systematically linked to life satisfaction.
Adopting this view transforms theory beyond the parochial concern of social
researchers alone and creates broad avenues for dialogue between researchers,
policy scientists (if not necessarily actual policy makers). No one currently writing
in social gerontology has understood and attempted to deal with this point to a
greater degree than my colleague Nancy Lohmann, who in a series of publications
has pointed out the convergences between the concepts of adjustment as used by the
sociologists following in the tradition of Cavan, Burgess, Havighurst and
Goldhammer, the concept of morale used by psychologists like Kutner and Lawton
and the concept of life satisfaction. Using both linguistic analysis and factor
analysis techniques and a sample drawn from older population of Knoxville,
Tennessee she demonstrated convincingly that this multi-disciplinary trio of
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concepts denotes a common domain of meaning, both conceptually and
operationally. This focus on meaning makes this study another of the important
contributions by social gerontologists to the interactionist canon, albeit within the
non-interactionist methodological domain of variable analysis. It seems highly
probable that similar results could be achieved in bringing in and taming
terminology and instruments for measuring “mental health” and “depression” as
well. For those of us interested in applied social science, the uses of life satisfaction
as a normative concept in social aging theory is an important dimension in both
social policy and the practices of social intervention.
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